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When a judge tries to find out what the government would have intended
which it did not say, he puts into its mouth things which he thinks it
ought to have said, and that is very close to substituting what he himself
thinks right. - Learned Hand'
I. INTRODUCTION
Helvering v. Gregory2 is one of the great old chestnuts of American
tax law. In it Judge Learned Hand and the Second Circuit created and
imposed on the tax treatment of corporate reorganizations a "business
purpose" requirement that appeared nowhere in the act of Congress that
*Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. S.B., Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 1986; J.D., Harvard University, 1989; LL.M., New York University, 1995.
1. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 108 (Irving Dillard ed., 3d ed. 1960).
2. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
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he was purporting to interpret. At a very deep level, that decision was
predicated on an assumption that the normal taxation of corporate
investments was full double taxation, under which all earnings in
corporate form are subject to taxation inside the corporation and then to
separate independent taxation at the investor level. Hand stated this
predicate explicitly in his opinion.3 It is a necessary predicate to justify
the wholesale creation of a business purpose requirement, whose
purpose was to reinforce that double-tax regime.
His decision reversed a Board of Tax Appeals decision applying a
literal reading of the statute.4 In contrast to Hand's view of the matter,
there are three distinct and important perspectives of the matter that lead
to a conclusion that the literal reading of the statute would have
produced the better result. None of these depends on literalism for its
own sake.
An Integrationist Perspective takes the view that double taxation is
problematic because of the distortions to allocative efficiency and
distributive equity that it generates.5  Integrationism would exactly
eliminate the excess burden of double taxation and the economic and
distributive distortions that double taxation entails. In the case of Evelyn
Gregory's transactions, the literal application made it possible in
particular situations of advancing the goals of the Integrationist
Perspective. She had found a statutory escape hatch from double
taxation, and Hand's opinion had the counterproductive effect of
unnecessarily sealing that escape hatch.
Second, even within a double-tax regime, it is even more difficult
to justify multiple levels of taxation.6 Gregory's escape hatch also made
it possible, at a minimum, to bypass an even more unjustifiable third, or
further, level of tax. Yet, Hand's opinion unnecessarily and
counterproductively blocked that route as well.
Third, from a consumption tax perspective the direct rollover from
one investment into another should not trigger taxation.7 The literal
application of the reorganization provisions to Gregory's transactions
3. Id.
4. Gregory v. Comm'r., 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932).
5. See Anthony P. Polito, Advancing to Corporate Tax Integration: A Laissez-Faire Ap-
proach, 55 S.C. L. REV. 1, 6-29 (2003).
6. See, e.g., Daniel C. Schaffer, The Income Tax on Intercorporate Dividends, 33 TAX LAW.
161 (1979).
7. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1165 (1974) [hereinafter Andrews, Consumption Tax]; William D. An-
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had this effect. From that perspective as well, Hand's opinion had a
counterproductive effect.
Each of these perspectives faces that objection that they are not the
perspectives of the tax law, that the tax law is not the enactment of pure
consumption taxation or integrationism and even tolerates multiple
taxation in many cases. Neither, however, was the tax law what Hand
assumed, the enactment of his own assumed norm, double income
taxation of corporate earnings. When each of these contrasting
perspectives is examined, it becomes apparent that U.S. tax law is, and
always has been, a careful complicated compromise among competing
views of sound taxation. The manifestation of that compromise is the
statutory language itself.
Nor was Gregory's case one in which a gap in the statute left the
legal question unanswered, which would have required the court to go
beyond the text of the statute in order to supply the needed answer.8 The
literal application of the statute did provide an answer. It was simply
one that Hand found inconsistent with his own view of the overriding
norm of taxation. As observed by the Board of Tax Appeals in its
examination of Gregory's transaction, "A statute so meticulously drafted
must be interpreted as a literal expression of the taxing policy . . . ."
This raises the most important perspective from which Hand's
opinion was mistaken. By taking his own preferred view of taxation as
the overriding norm, he ignored the other perspectives that went into the
legislative compromise. In effect, he set aside the deal made in
Congress to favor his own preferred view. Given a statute that reflects a
delicate compromise among competing policy perspectives, the best
evidence of the proper interpretation of the compromise is the language
of the statute itself. From this perspective the literal application of the
statutory language was the appropriate course for an interpreting court
because it was the most faithful way to implement that compromise.
At a fundamental level, this Article is about interpretation. The
best way for a court to remain faithful to a complicated statute reflecting
a delicate legislative compromise is to enforce its language literally
without introducing extraneous tests or elements that cannot be found in
8. A classic statement of this point is owed to Justice Holmes: "I recognize without hesita-
tion that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially . . . ." S. Pac. Co. v. Jen-
sen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). It was only within these interstices that Jus-
tice Holmes recognized a legitimate scope for courts "to exercise the sovereign prerogative of
choice." Oliver W. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REv. 443, 461
(1899).
9. Gregory v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. 223, 225 (1932).
2014] 67
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the statutory language. Yet, it is important to be clear that it approaches
the question from an ex ante perspective, from where things stood before
Learned Hand's famous opinion.
This Article is not a call for the judicial reversal of Hand's opinion.
Given the value of the predictability of established expectations as to
statutory meaning, stare decisis is at its strongest when applied to
statutory interpretation. As Justice Brandeis observed:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be
settled right. This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of
serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation.'0
The business purpose requirement is now reflected in a Treasury
Regulation" that is entitled to a high degree of deference.' 2 Congress
has had multiple opportunities to eliminate it and has not so done.' 3
No, this Article is not an argument for the judicial reversal of a
familiar old decision. It advances the claim that, as of the time the court
faced the decision, the outcome it selected was incorrect from multiple
policy perspectives and therefore a counterproductive exercise of the
interpretive authority. Moreover, at the time decided, it was a mistaken
use of the interpretive authority to upset a carefully set legislative
compromise in favor of the court's own preferred outcome.
Before proceeding, a further caveat is necessary. Although the
Supreme Court upheld Hand's opinion unanimously,14 this Article
focuses primarily on Hand's opinion for the Second Circuit for good
reasons. His is the more frequently quoted of the two opinions. His
opinion is the more extensive of the two. It sets out more thoroughly the
justification for creating a business purpose requirement, while the
Supreme Court opinion largely relies on its reference to Hand's
opinion.' 5
10. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
I1. Treas. Reg. §l.368-l(c) (2011).
12. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984) (recognizing a high degree of deference to an administrative agency when it is interpreting a
statute within the scope of its authority); Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. U.S., 562
U.S. _ 131 S. Ct. 704, 711-14 (2011) (applying Chevron to Treasury Regulations).
13. See, e.g., Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 561 (1991); Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1967); Helvering v.
Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938).
14. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
15. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469 ("The reasoning of the court below in justification of a negative
answer leaves little to be said.").
68 [29:65
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II. THE TRANSACTION AND HAND'S TAX TREATMENT OF IT
The facts and circumstances of Evelyn Gregory's transaction are
well known to those well-versed in the history of U.S. corporate taxation
but bear a brief repetition here. In 1928, Evelyn Gregory owned all of
the outstanding stock of United Mortgage Corporation ("United"),
purchased between October 1, 1920, and January 3, 1928. Her
combined basis in that stock was $350,000.16 Among its assets, United
held 1,000 shares of Monitor Securities Corporation ("Monitor"), which
it purchased in 1922 at a cost of $10,413.07.17
Gregory determined to dispose of the Monitor stock in a tax
efficient manner. Therefore, Averill Corporation ("Averill") was
organized under Delaware law on September 18, 1928, and on
September 20, the Monitor stock was transferred to Averill. In
exchange, Averill issued it shares to Gregory. This spin-off transaction
was structured to take advantage of the reorganization provision of the
Revenue Act of 1928, which provided that:
The term "reorganization" means (A) a merger or consolidation (in-
cluding the acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority of the
voting stock and at least a majority of the total number of shares of all
other classes of stock of another corporation, or substantially all the
properties of another corporation), or (B) a transfer by a corporation
of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after
the transfer the transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of
the corporation to which the assets are transferred, or (C) a recapitali-
zation, or (D) a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization,
however effected.' 8
The equivalent spin-off transaction under the contemporary Internal
Revenue Code would be termed a divisive-D reorganization. 19 Congress
has since adopted additional requirements for such a transaction to
qualify as a reorganization,2 0 qualifying requirements that Gregory's
transaction would not have satisfied.
Gregory reported no gain on the transaction2' and apportioned her
original basis in the United stock to the Averill stock in proportion to its
16. Gregory v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. 223, 224 (1932).
17. Brief for Respondent at 3, Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), available at 1934
WL 60141.
18. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(i), 45 Stat. 791, 818 (1927-1929) (emphasis added).
19. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (2012).
20. I.R.C. § 355 (2012).
21. Revenue Act of 1928, § 112(g), 45 Stat. at 818.
20141 69
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value relative to the remaining value of the United stock.22 Thus,
immediately after the spin-off, her basis in the Averill stock was
$57,325.45, and her remaining basis in the United stock was
$292,674.55.23 Reorganization treatment also made the transaction non-
taxable to United.2 4
On September 24, Averill Corporation liquidated and distributed its
sole asset, the Monitor stock, to Gregory.25 Gregory reported gain upon
the liquidation of Averill in the amount of $76,007.88, calculated as
$133,333.33 (the fair market value of the Monitor stock)26 less
$57,325.45 (the apportioned basis in her Averill stock).2 7 Averill
recognized no gain or loss on its liquidating distribution. 28 Gregory took
a fair market value basis in the Monitor stock, and therefore recognized
no further gain or loss on its sale the same day as the liquidation for
$133,333.33.29 She treated most of the gain as capital gain taxable at
preferential rates,"o but only in the same proportion that the holding
period for her United stock was more than two years. 31 Thus, according
to Gregory's characterization, there was no corporate level tax and the
single shareholder-level tax was primarily imposed at capital gain rates.
In contrast to this literal application of the Revenue Act of 1928's
explicit language to Gregory's transactions, Judge Learned Hand posed
an alternative hypothetical transaction that would have been subject to
very different tax treatment.
In 1928 it became possible to sell the Monitor shares at a large profit,
but if this had been done directly, the United Mortgage Corporation
would have been obliged to pay a normal tax on the resulting gain, and
the taxpayer, if she wished to touch her profit, must do so in the form
22. Revenue Act of 1928, § I13(a)(9), 45 Stat. at 820.
23. Gregory v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. 223, 224 (1932); Brief for Petitioner at 4, Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), available at 1934 WL 60333.
24. Revenue Act of 1928, § 112(b)(4), 45 Stat. at 816.
25. Gregory v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. at 224.
26. Id. at 224. (the value of the Monitor stock was determined based on its sale price on the
same day).
27. Id. See also Revenue Act of 1928, §§ 111(a), 115(c), 45 Stat. at 815, 822.
28. See Treas. Reg. § 45, art. 547 (1919), reprinted in 134 UNITED STATES REVENUE ACTS
1909-1950, 140 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979) ("No gain or loss is realized by a corporation
from the mere distribution of its assets in kind upon dissolution, however they may have appreciated
or depreciated in value since their acquisition.").
29. Gregory v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. at 224.
30. Revenue Act of 1928, § 101, 45 Stat. at 811-12.
31. Of Gregory's 5,000 shares of United stock, 3,300 shares had a holding period of more
than two years. Therefore, 66 percent of her gain was long-term capital gain. Gregory v. Comm'r,
27 B.T.A. at 226.
70 [29:65
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of a dividend, on which a surtax would have been assessed against her
personally. 32
In Hand's view it is clear that the normative treatment is double taxation,
once at the corporate level and again at the shareholder level, and that
the shareholder level tax normatively ought to be at the dividend rate.
Hand clearly sees the transaction as escaping one level of taxation
entirely and improperly converting the second level of tax from
"normative" dividend taxation to preferential capital gain taxation.
It is from this starting point that he creates and imposes a
requirement that a valid reorganization must serve an independent
business purpose other than the minimization of taxes, even though no
such requirement appears anywhere in the statute. Hand asserts that:
Nevertheless, it does not follow that Congress meant to cover such a
transaction, not even though the facts answer the dictionary definitions
of each term used in the statutory definition. It is quite true, as the
Board has very well said, that as the articulation of a statute increases,
the room for interpretation must contract; but the meaning of a sen-
tence may be more than that of the separate words, as a melody is more
than the notes, and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse
to the setting in which all appear, and which all collectively create.33
He proceeds to conclude that the "melody" here is that a transaction
satisfying all of the statutory requirements of being a reorganization is
nevertheless not one unless motivated by a business purpose.34
Therefore, Gregory received a dividend distribution, whether of the
Averill stock or of the Monitor stock, in an amount of $133,333.33. 36
Although the tax treatment of United was not before Hand's court,
it seems clear that from his perspective the normal treatment is that it
32. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
33. Id. at 810-ll.
34. Id.at811.
35. Id.
36. The full amount of the distribution would be a dividend only if United's earnings and
profits were at least as great. Revenue Act of 1928, § l15(a) & (b), 45 Stat. at 822. Neither the Sec-
ond Circuit nor the Supreme Court addressed this issue. The Commissioner asserted in his brief to
the Supreme Court that, in the absence of taxpayer proof to the contrary, Gregory must be treated as
if United did have sufficient earnings and profits to make the entire amount a dividend. Brief for
Respondent at 8, 26, Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), available at 1934 WL 60141.
That Gregory did not argue in the alternative that United had insufficient earnings and profits to
make a deemed distribution a dividend suggests strongly that United had sufficient earnings and
profits. See Brief for Petitioner, Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), available at 1934 WL
60333. This Article accepts that premise of sufficient earnings and profits for the balance of its
analysis.
2014]1 HELVERING v. GREGORY 71
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also should have been taxed on the excess of the Monitor stock's value
over its basis. 37  Hand makes a point of contradicting the
Commissioner's view that Averill should be treated as if it never existed.
It did exist and there was an exchange of assets between it and United.
He then proceeds to acknowledge that the dividend taxation of Gregory
would be the same regardless of whether she were treated as having
received a dividend of Averill stock or a dividend of Monitor stock.
Why then does he bother with the point that there was a transfer between
United and Averill? It seems likely that it serves to establish that in
principle United should also have been taxable on this transaction based
on the exchange that he did not consider a valid reorganization, 38
because it did not satisfy the independent business purpose requirement
that he had created.
III. HAND'S ASSERTED JUSTIFICATION
In asserting that the business purpose requirement completes the
"melody" of the statute, Hand presents three distinct justifications, and
they deserve examination. The most directly textual justification he
presents is his assertion that "the act itself gives evidence that, on
occasion anyway, the purpose of a transaction should be the guide." 39
His evidence of this is two provisions of the Revenue Act. One is a
provision that a stock redemption be treated as a dividend distribution to
the extent that it is "essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable
dividend." 40 The other is a provision providing that a distribution of
boot property in a reorganization be treated as a dividend to the extent
that it "has the effect of the distribution of a taxable dividend."4 1
Neither of these provisions refers to purpose as a guide, but Hand is
himself, apparently, concluding that "essentially equivalent" and
"effect" imply a purpose-oriented test. Supreme Court decisions,
decided many years after Hand's opinion in Gregory, conclude that a
transaction's purpose has no bearing on the application of the same
language in the contemporary analogues of those provisions.4 2
37. Hclvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
38. Helvering, 69 F.2d at 811.
39. Id.
40. Revenue Act of 1928, § 115(g), 45 Stat. at 822-23. See I.R.C. § 302 (2012) (analogous
provision in contemporary law).
41. Revenue Act of 1928, § I12(c)(2), 45 Stat. at 817. See I.R.C. § 356(a)(2) (2012) (analo-
gous provision in contemporary law).
42. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 307-14 (1970) (holding that business purpose has
no bearing on whether a stock redemption is essentially equivalent to a dividend); Comm'r v. Clark,
72 [29:65
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Regardless of the weakness of Hand's assertion that these are purpose-
oriented provisions, there is a greater problem of what purpose
orientation in these provisions would imply for the reorganization
definition. It is possible that Hand's point is that the interpretive
imputation of a purpose requirement in those provisions proves that the
court has the authority to impute a purpose requirement in another
provision, but how are the occasions of such cross imputation to be
identified and justified? He does not say.
Second, Hand cites the cases creating a continuity of proprietary
interest requirement in the context of acquisitive reorganizations,4 3 even
though there is no express reference to it in the statutory language."
Hand refers to these cases as "pertinent, if not authoritative," and goes
on to assert that, "The violence done the literal interpretation of the
words is no less than what we do here." 45  Without rehearsing the
appropriateness of the judicial imputation of the continuity of interest
requirement to the acquisitive reorganization provision, it seems that the
most Hand can, or wants to, get from these decisions is that the authority
for the judicial imputation of an unstated requirement in one provision
justifies the assertion of that authority to impute another different
unstated requirement in a related provision. Neither of those cases can
explain whether, or why, a purpose requirement should be imputed to
the reorganization provision.4 6
Third, Hand justifies his assertion of a business purpose
requirement by quoting from legislative history47 that the purpose of the
489 U.S. 726, 737-40 (1989) (interpreting "effect of the distribution of a dividend" without refer-
ence to the purpose of the transaction under consideration).
43. Pincllas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Comm'r, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Prairie Oil & Gas Co.
v. Motter, 66 F.2d 309, 311 (10th Cir. 1933); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 937 (2d
Cir. 1932).
44. Revenue Act of 1928, § I 12(i)(1)(A), 45 Stat. at 818; Revenue Act of 1926, Ch. 27, §
203(h)(1)(A), 44 Stat. 9, 14; Revenue Act of 1924, Ch. 234, § 203(h)(1)(A), 43 Stat. 253, 257. See
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A), (B), & (C) (2012) (analogous provisions in contemporary law).
45. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934).
46. Hand also cites Lonsdale v. Comm'r, 32 F.2d 537, 539 (8th Cir. 1929), a case in which a
corporation declared a cash dividend to its shareholders and gave them the option to invest the divi-
dend in a new corporation. The transaction failed to meet the literal definition of the alleged spin-
off reorganization, which required a direct transfer from one corporation to another. See Revenue
Act of 1924, Ch. 234, § 203(h)(1)(B), 43 Stat. 253, 257.
47. The appropriateness of consulting legislative history in the interpretation of statutes is a
question that has been hotly contested in recent decades, see, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 29-37 (1997) (rejecting the use of legislative
history); CHRISTIAN W. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 153-86 (2002) (reviewing arguments in favor of and opposed to the use of legisla-
tive history), but that debate is not directly addressed by this Article.
2014] 73
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reorganization provision is to exempt "from tax the gain from exchanges
made in connection with a reorganization in order that ordinary business
transactions will not be prevented." 48  Yet it far from obvious that
Gregory's transaction is not an ordinary business transaction. One might
easily take the view that the transaction was an ordinary one of removing
assets from a corporation that satisfied all of the explicit requirements of
the statute in order to prevent the payment of more tax than strictly
mandated by the law.
Hand, however, makes a leap that the set of "ordinary business
transactions" to which the Congressional committee reports referred was
more restrictive than actually described by the statute, and then he makes
a further leap that it is necessary to impose an unstated requirement that
only transactions satisfying his business purpose requirement are
"ordinary." At the same time, he makes no reference to other portions of
those same committee reports that indicate that the reorganization
provision was drafted in a manner that "results in definiteness and
accuracy and enables a taxpayer to determine prior to the consummation
of a given transaction the tax liability that will result therefrom." 49
Neither the business purpose requirement by itself nor raising the
prospect of qualifications unstated in the statutory text serve those ends.
Implicitly, Hand made another leap, that limiting reorganization
treatment to those satisfying his concept of "ordinary business
transactions" was important enough to disregard the expressed desire for
increased definiteness of taxpayers' ability to determine the tax
treatment of their transactions ex ante. At no point does he explain why
"ordinary" implies the unlegislated business purpose requirement.
In fact, none of Hand's asserted justifications directly support an
inference that, as an interpretive matter, the correct unlegislated piece of
the statute is a business purpose requirement. It is unlikely that Hand
even saw the problem in those terms. It is more likely that he asserted
these justifications as giving him authority to impute a requirement not
stated in the statutory language but that he concluded to be necessary.
That position, however, can be justified only if one accepts a number of
assumptions: that there is a single clear normative principle of taxation
underlying the statute; that Hand has correctly identified that normative
48. H.R. REP. NO. 68-179 (1924), S. Rep. No. 68-398 (1924), reprinted in JACOB S.
SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS: 1938-1861 690
(1938).
49. H.R. REP. No. 68-179 (1924), S. Rep. No. 68-398 (1924), reprinted in JACOB S.
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deviations from the norm to be interpreted narrowly; and that it is a
court's function to police for gaps in the statute that allow for
"excessive" deviations from the normative principle and to devise
mechanisms to fill those gaps.
That foundation of those assumptions, however, breaks down right
at the beginning if the taxing statute does not represent a single
normative principle of taxation. If instead the tax law is and always has
been an elaborate compromise between directly competing visions of
ideal tax policy, without a single normative baseline, it simply is not
possible to sort taxing provisions into normative provisions and
exception provisions. In that case, no neutral principle identifies gaps to
be filled. The question then is to identify these additional normative
principles reflected in the statute. The analysis turns next to several
perspectives that serve as normative principles of taxation; perspectives
from which Hand's analysis is wrong as to Evelyn Gregory's
transactions.
IV. AN INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTIVE
From an Integrationist Perspective double taxation is problematic
because of the distortions to allocative efficiency and distributive equity
that it generates. 50 Integrationism would exactly eliminate the excess
burden of double taxation and the economic and distributive distortions
that double taxation entails. In principle, the nearest one might come to
a perfectly integrated regime is the fiscal transparency of a full
passthrough regime. Under such a tax regime, there would be no
corporate-level tax. Instead, all of the revenue of the corporation would
be taxed as income of some individual. The nearest analogue is the tax
treatment of partnerships. '
The Integrationist Perspective counsels that the Gregory
transactions should generate a single level of tax, not two. That tax
should be at the shareholder level, because business entities should be
fiscally transparent. Further, the disposition of corporate assets should
be treated as nearly as possible as if the shareholders owned those assets
50. See Polito, supra note 5.
51. See I.R.C. §§ 701-777, 6221-6234 (2012). In practice, fiscal transparency cannot be cf-
fected in a manner that fully eliminates all distinctions between a business conducted directly as an
individual's sole proprietorship and an enterprise conducted through a legal structure. See LAURA
E. CUNNINGHAM & NOEL B. CUNNINGHAM, THE LOGIC OF SUBCHAPTER K (3d ed. 2006). Never-
theless, the partnership paradigm appears to be the nearest alternative possible to the integrationist
ideal.
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Therefore, because the disposition of the Monitor stock would qualify
for capital gain treatment5 3 if it had been held as part of an investment
portfolio in an individual taxpayer's hands,5 4 the Integrationist
Perspective counsels that it should be treated as a capital asset
notwithstanding that it was held in an investment company" in the form
of a corporation.
Thus, from the Integrationist Perspective, Gregory's treatment of
this transaction, as modified by the Board of Tax Appeals, 56 is the
correct result. As a consequence of the reorganization and liquidation,
there was no corporate level tax. Gregory reported a gain and paid a tax
at capital gain rates to the same extent as if she had held the assets
directly. Hand's disallowance of reorganization treatment by creating
a business purpose requirement would, if his preferred structure were
executed in full, have had the result only of reinforcing the distortions of
the double tax system.58  Gregory's transactions, if respected at face
value, would have had the virtue of correcting those distortions in this
case.
52. Cf I.R.C. § 702 (2012).
53. See Revenue Act of 1928, § 101(a), 45 Stat. at 811.
54. Under the Revenue Act of 1928, the term "capital asset" referred to:
[P]ropcrty held by the taxpayer for more than two years (whether or not connected with
his trade or business) but does not include stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property
of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at
the close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale in the
course of his trade or business.
Revenue Act of 1928, § 101(c)(8), 45 Stat. at 811-12. The Revenue Act of 1928 provided no other
carve-outs from capital asset classification for assets that met the minimum holding period require-
ment. Because the disposition of stock held by an investor does not fall within the above exclusion
from capital asset treatment, the Monitor stock was properly classified as a capital asset under that
provision, to the extent it met the requisite two year holding period. See, e.g., Taylor v. Comm'r, 76
F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1935); Wallace v. U.S., 50 F. Supp. 178 (D.C. N.Y. 1943); Trost v. Comm'r, 34
B.T.A. 24 (1936); Weld v. Comm'r, 31 B.T.A. 600 (1934); Gilbert v. Comm'r, 20 B.T.A. 765
(1930). In 1934, this statutory language was amended to refer to "property held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers...." Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 117(b), 48 Stat. 680, 714
(emphasis added). The amendment was justified as "making it impossible to contend that a stock
speculator trading on his own account is not subject to . . . [capital gain treatment.]" H.R. REP. NO.
73-1385, at 22 (1934).
55. United was an investment company, see Brief for Petitioner at 3, Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465 (1935), available at 1934 WL 60333.
56. Gregory v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. at 226.
57. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
58. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934).
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A. The Basis Question
There remains, within the Integrationist Perspective, a potential
technical objection that the amount of gain Gregory reported was too
low because of the manner in which basis was allocated between her
United stock and the Averill stock. Gregory apportioned her original
basis in the United stock to the Averill stock in proportion to its value
relative to the remaining value of the United stock.59 Thus, immediately
after the spin-off, her basis in the Averill stock was $57,325.45, and her
remaining basis in the United stock was $292,674.55.60 Gregory
reported gain upon the liquidation of Averill in the amount of
$76,007.88, calculated as $133,333.33 (the fair market value of the
Monitor stock)61 less $57,325.45 (the apportioned basis in her Averill
stock).62
The potential technical objection is that the basis used in the gain
calculation was too high and the appropriate basis was $10,413.07, the
price at which United purchased the Monitor stock.63 If the lower basis
were used, Gregory would have reported an additional gain of
$46,912.38 in 1928. Her basis in the United stock would be
correspondingly increased by the same amount and a later disposition of
that stock would have resulted in a correspondingly lower gain. In that
sense, the objection pertains to a deferral of taxation with respect to
$46,912.38.
A useful exercise is to determine an upper limit to the value of the
deferral involved. If one assumes that Gregory would have inherited
United's basis in the Monitor stock, it seems fair to imagine she would
also have inherited its holding period,64 which began in 1922.65
Therefore, the gain would all have been capital gain subject to a
59. Revenue Act of 1928, § I13(a)(9), 45 Stat. at 820.
60. Gregory v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. at 224; Brief for Petitioner at 4, Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465 (1935), available at 1934 WL 60333.
61. The value of the Monitor stock was determined based on its sale price on the same day.
Gregory v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. at 224.
62. Id. See also Revenue Act of 1928, §§ 111(a), 115(c), 45 Stat. at 815, 822.
63. Brief for Respondent at 3, Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), available at 1934
WL 60141.
64. Cf 1.R.C. § 1223(2) (2012). If that were true, the $76,007.88 gain that Gregory did re-
port would all have been capital gain, rather than only 66 percent capital gain, see supra note 31 and
accompanying text. In that case, her tax on the reported gain would have been lower than what she
actually paid. That amount should, in principle, be offset against and reduce the amount of deferred
tax in comparison to the actual treatment of the transactions. However, that offset is superfluous to
the point made here and the estimation of that reduction is not pursued.
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maximum tax rate of 12.5 percent.6 6 That makes the deferred tax
$5,864.05 (12.5 percent of $46,912.38). If Gregory continued to hold
the United stock through the time of her death, that deferral would have
been permanent because of the step-up in basis for property transmitted
at death. 67  Based on that assumption, the amount of the tax is also the
upper limit on the value of the deferral.6 8
An important counterpoint to this deferral question arises from
noting that United was treated by both Gregory and the IRS as having
earnings and profits at least as great as the value of the Monitor stock.69
Because a single shareholder-level tax is normative from the
Integrationist Perspective, the corporate level tax paid in relation to
those earnings should in principle be credited against the normative
shareholder level tax. Therefore, even if the gain on the disposition of
the Monitor stock should have been determined in 1928 using the lower
basis figure, the value of deferral at the shareholder level should be
66. Revenue Act of 1928, § 101, 45 Stat. at 811-12.
67. Revenue Act of 1928, § I 13(a)(5), 45 Stat. at 819.
68. An interesting perspective is to compare, in the particular circumstances of the Gregory
case, the upper limit to the value of the deferral with the extent of the excess tax burden, from an
Integrationist Perspective, of imposing the double tax treatment that Hand assumed to be the norm.
At the outset, it is important to note that it is difficult, if it is possible at all, to compare the welfare
harm to society of a dollar of deferral to the welfare harm of a dollar of excess tax burden from
double taxation. This is because there is no a priori reason to assume that a dollar of each produces
social welfare harm in the same amount. Therefore, this comparison of numbers is not dispositive,
but it does shed some light on the question.
Starting with the upper limit to deferral already calculated, the next step is to estimate the
excess tax burden of imposing full double taxation. Caution counsels calculating a lower limit on
the excess tax burden. Based on the corporate tax rate of 12 percent, Revenue Act of 1928, § 13, 45
Stat. at 797, if United had sold the Monitor shares, its marginal tax would have been $14,750.43 (12
percent x ($133,333.33 - $10,413.07)). Assume a dividend distribution to Gregory of the full value
of the Monitor shares, but take the lowest estimate of the dividend tax by assuming the dividend
was her only net income for the taxable year. Revenue Act of 1928, § 12, 45 Stat. at 796-97. This
produces a dividend tax of $18,326.67. The sum of these two figures is then reduced by the maxi-
mum estimate of a single shareholder level tax at capital gain rates. Using the same basis figure as
used in determining the deferral and assuming the application of the maximum capital gain rate,
Revenue Act of 1928, § 101, 45 Stat. at 811-12, the shareholder level tax would have been
$15,365.03 (12.5 percent x ($133,333.33 - $10,413.07)). That produces a lower limit on the excess
tax burden of $17,712.07 ($14,750.43 + $18,326.67 - $15,365.03). Note that based on the assump-
tion that proceeds of the Monitor stock sale were Gregory's only income, to minimize the dividend
tax and then to use of the maximum capital gain rate actually overstates the effective normative
single shareholder tax. Revenue Act of 1928, §§ 12, 101, 45 Stat. at 796-97, 811-12. That further
understates the extent of the excess tax burden. At an absolute minimum, the excess tax burden of
imposing full double taxation in the Gregory situation is more than 300 percent
($17,712.07/$5,864.05) of the value of the deferral of using the higher basis number. As noted
above, this comparison does not dispositively prove the relative welfare loss to society of deferral in
comparison to the excess burden of double taxation, but it is worth noting.
69. See supra note 36.
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correspondingly offset by the corporate level tax with respect to the
distribution of earnings previously taxed at the corporate level.
In practice, it is impossible to determine the exact amount of
corporate tax that should be seen as offsetting the normative shareholder
level tax, because the disparity between corporate tax rates and
individual rates varied substantially over the years during which
United's earnings were accumulated. 70  Nevertheless, an estimate is
possible based on the 1928 rates. At that time, the corporate tax rate of
12 percent7' was seven percentage points higher than the maximum
individual normal tax rate72 for which it substituted.73 Using those
figures, one can estimate that the amount of corporate tax that should
offset the deferral is $10,606.0 ($133,333.33 x (.07/(1 - 0.12))). Based
on those figures, in Gregory's case, the excess tax at the corporate level
more than fully offsets and pays for the tax deferral estimated above.
The actual offset may well have been smaller because the disparity
between the corporate tax rate and the maximum individual normal rate
for which it substitutes may have been smaller in the years earnings were
accumulated. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that even if one concludes
that using the higher basis figure was a mistake, the consequent deferral
is at least partially offset, from an Integrationist Perspective, by the
excess corporate tax.
These estimates, depending so heavily upon the specific
circumstances of the Gregory transactions, are difficult to generalize.
Perhaps the best, and most straightforward, way to consider this question
is to address the problem of basis allocation directly. It is true that the
allocation of basis between the Averill stock and the Monitor stock did
control the degree to which gain taxation could be deferred. That kind
of basis allocation question, which is unavoidable within the context of a
transactionalist 74 tax system, is necessarily arbitrary,75  and this is
perhaps never more so than when a single investment is divided into
70. STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CORPORATE
INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT 109 (2010).
71. Revenue Act of 1928, § 13, 45 Stat. at 797.
72. Revenue Act of 1928, § 11, 45 Stat. at 795.
73. See infra notes 88-114 and accompanying text.
74. A transactionalist tax system refers to a system, like the Internal Revenue Code, that
measures the tax base by reference solely to completed transactions. It is in contrast to an accretion-
ist system in which changes to asset value arc taken into account in the years in which they accrue
in an economic sense without waiting for a completed transaction to measure that accretion.
75. See Anthony P. Polito, Borrowing, Return of Capital Conventions and the Structure of
the Income Tax: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 17 VA. TAX REV. 467 (1998).
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tWO76 as occurred in Gregory. One model would have been the
treatment that applies currently when a partnership distributes an asset to
a partner without triggering gain recognition. The partner's basis in the
distributed asset is the same as the partnership's basis in the asset,77 and
the partner's basis in the partnership interest is reduced pro tanto.78 That
model would have produced the higher 1928 gain indicated above. In
the context of a reorganization, Congress elected to apportion basis in
proportion to value, producing the lower 1928 gain figure. 79
There is no a priori principle that would justify preferring one basis
allocation over the other. It is necessarily a policy question as to how
much untaxed gain should be preserved in each asset.80 This is a policy
question that is quite distinct from that of whether to prefer an integrated
tax system or a double tax system. In that sense, the Integrationist
Perspective would counsel setting the issue aside and accepting the
result of the literal application of the basis convention that Congress
prescribed for the transaction in question. In that sense, there is no
deferral, or at least there is no deferral that would have called for a
judicial remedy. The basis question is a policy question independent of
the tax integration question and one best left to Congress.
B. "But, It's a Double Tax System, Isn't It? "
Having addressed the basis question, the analysis is left with the
conclusion that respecting the treatment of Gregory's transactions would
have produced the correct result from an Integrationist Perspective.
Hand's introduction of a business purpose requirement into a statute that
did not provide for one was counterproductive to the extent that it
succeeded in undermining the integrationist result. Yet, one must
anticipate an objection that the Integrationist Perspective is not the
statutory norm and that Hand was correct when he characterized double
taxation as the norm. The objection is that, "It's a double tax system,
not an integrated system."
In fact, such a claim was a bad exaggeration in 1928 and remains so
today. The system is actually a complicated compromise between the
Integrationist Perspective and double taxation. Clearly there were, and
are, substantial elements of corporate double taxation to U.S. tax law.
76. Id. at 542-43, 548-51.
77. I.R.C. § 732(a) (2012).
78. I.R.C. § 733 (2012).
79. Revenue Act of 1928, § II 3(a)(9), 45 Stat. at 820.
80. See Polito, supra note 75, at 556-71.
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At the same time, however, there have always been significant elements
of the tax law that are more consistent with the Integrationist Perspective
than with double taxation.
In a pure double-tax system, the imposition of a corporate tax
would be irrelevant to the taxation of the investors in a corporate
enterprise. Their separate shares of corporate earnings would be subject
to a second full individual income tax, perhaps in the same year as
earned in the corporation or at the time of distribution. Even the latter
possibility could be seen as a deviation from pure double taxation,
because the investors'81 tax would be deferred in comparison to the
taxation of investors in fiscally transparent entities. In comparison, pure
integrationism would impose no entity level tax at all and would impose
a single tax at the investor level in the same year as earned.82
The federal tax treatment of corporations is actually at some
intermediate point on the spectrum between those two possibilities, and,
at the time of Hand's opinion in Gregory, this had been true for many
years. The first federal income tax system enacted during the Civil War
generally treated corporations as passthrough entities just like
partnerships. In addition, there was a 5 percent tax on dividends of
banking, insurance, and transportation businesses and on interest on
bonded indebtedness of transportation businesses.8 4 However, dividends
and interest were deductible by individual taxpayers if already taxed at
the corporate level.85 The individual income tax did not apply to
incomes below $600 and was applied at graduated rates of up to 10
81. Even the use of the term "investor" here, instead of shareholder, member, owner, ctc., is
intentional to emphasize that even the distinction in treatment between debt and equity could be
considered a deviation from pure double taxation. Interest payments on corporate debt have always
been deductible by the corporation. See Revenue Act of 1928, § 23(b), 45 Stat. at 799; 1.R.C. § 163
(2012). In effect, the deduction equates the taxable corporation with the share of its revenue stream
that accrues to the benefit of its shareholders. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Corporate Interest De-
duction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585, 1587-88 (1974). A policy perspective could be
used to justify imposing double taxation to a broader or narrower base, but the distinction between
debt and equity is the arbitrary line under the statute that defines the extent of that imposition. See
Anthony P. Polito, Useful Fictions: Debt and Equity Classification in Corporate Tax Law, 30 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 761 (1998).
82. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 701 (2012).
83. Act of June 30, 1864, ch.173, § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 282.
84. Act of June 30, 1864, §§ 120-122, 13 Stat. at 283-85. These taxes were not imposed on
corporations per se, but based on the nature of the business conducted. Nevertheless, most of these
businesses were conducted in corporate form. See Bank, supra, note 70, at 15. There was a 5 per-
cent tax on undistributed earnings of banking and insurance businesses, but that tax was credited
against the tax on dividends when those earnings were later distributed. Act of June 30, 1864, §
121, 13 Stat. at 284.
85. Act of June 30, 1864, § 117, 13 Stat. at 282.
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percent.86 This created a degree of double taxation to the extent
dividends and interest were fully taxable at the corporate level with
respect to shareholders below the $600 threshold, but it also created
preferential treatment for shareholders who were themselves taxable at
the higher rates. The tax then was primarily an integrated tax.
The 1894 tax act would have imposed8 8 a separate corporate tax but
also achieved a form of tax integration. A 2 percent tax was imposed on
the income of individuals and corporations alike, but dividends were not
subject to the individual income tax. Thus, the corporate tax served as a
surrogate for the taxation of individual shareholders on their shares of
corporate earnings. The integration achieved, however, was not perfect.
Individuals were subject to separate taxation only to the extent that their
incomes exceeded a threshold amount of $4,000.89 The threshold
amount did not apply to corporations, and the full 2 percent tax applied
to corporate earnings regardless of whether individual shareholders'
incomes were less than the threshold.90  That disparity effectively
imposed a limited extent of double taxation, but it was primarily an
integrated tax.
The first income tax enacted under the authority of the Sixteenth
Amendment, 9 1 also achieved a form of tax integration. The individual
income tax was split into two components: a normal tax of 1 percent of
incomes in excess of an exemption amount of $3,000 for single filers
and $4,000 for married filers; and a surtax ranging from 1 percent to 6
percent on incomes in excess of $20,000.92 The surtax added a degree
of progressivity to the individual income tax. Corporations were subject
to a flat 1 percent tax,93 but dividends were subject only to the surtax in
shareholders' hands.94 Thus, as in the case of 1894 tax, the corporate tax
substituted for the individual shareholder tax, achieving a rough form of
rate integration.
It was, however, not perfect integrationism. First, there was the
86. Act of June 30, 1864, § 116, 13 Stat. at 281.
87. In addition, there was a gross receipts tax on certain types of business conducted primari-
ly in corporate form. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 80, 12 Stat. 432, 468-69 (3 percent gross re-
ccipts tax); Act of June 30, 1864, § 103, 13 Stat. at 275-76 (2.5 percent gross receipts tax).
88. The Supreme Court ruled the tax act unconstitutional before it could take effect. Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
89. Act of August 27, 1894, ch. 349, §§ 27-28 & 32, 28 Stat. 509, 553-54, 556.
90. See BANK, supra note 70, at 51-52.
91. U.S. Const. amend. XVI.
92. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(A), 38 Stat. 114, 166-67.
93. Revenue Act of 1913, § 2(G), 38 Stat. at 172.
94. Revenue Act of 1913, § 2(B), 38 Stat. at 167.
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inapplicability of the exemption amounts to earnings in corporate form,
which imposed double taxation to a partial degree. At the same time, the
application of the surtax on corporate earnings was deferred until
distribution. In present value terms, therefore, the tax imposed on
corporate earnings was less for a corporation retaining earnings than for
a partnership subject to immediate passthrough treatment. As an offset
to this possibility, individuals were subject to the full surtax on their
shares of retained gains and profits of corporations "formed or
fraudulently availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of
such tax through the [retention of earnings] ... [and of which] .. . the
gains and profits are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable
needs of the business shall be prima facie evidence of a fraudulent
purpose . .. In practice, it was possible to accumulate significant
earnings without triggering this additional tax. Overall, the Revenue Act
of 1913 is well described as an integrated income tax.
The War Revenue Act of 1917, however, raised the maximum
surtax to 50 percent. 96 Therefore, continuing to tax corporations at a rate
equal to the normal individual rate and taxing distributions at only the
surtax rate created a substantial preference, in present value terms, for
retained corporate earnings in comparison to earnings retained in a
partnership subject to passthrough treatment. In fact, if-as was widely
supposed-the surtax rates were to be reduced substantially after World
War I, the ability to retain corporate earnings would have turned into a
significant partial exemption from the surtax, in comparison to earnings
via a partnership subject to passthrough taxation.
A proposed resolution considered by Congress was to impose a 15
percent tax on retained corporate earnings in excess of an exemption
amount of 20 percent of corporate earnings. The full surtax would have
continued to apply to distributed corporate earnings. Instead of moving
in this direction toward double taxation, Congress adopted a compromise
position. Congress raised the corporate tax by two percentage points
above the normal individual tax.97 Thus, distributed corporate earnings
were subject to a higher combined corporate and individual rate than
other forms of income subject only to individual taxation, but the extent
of double taxation of distributed earnings was relatively minor.98
Congress also imposed a 10 percent tax on corporate earnings retained
95. Revenue Act of 1913, § 2(A), 38 Stat. at 166-67.
96. War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 2, 40 Stat. 300, 301
97. War Revenue Act of 1917, §§ 1, 4, 40 Stat. at 300-01, 302.
98. BANK, supra, note 70, at 94-96.
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beyond the reasonable requirements of the business, 99 which imposed a
second level of tax on some but not all corporations and-even when
imposed-was at a significantly lower rate than the maximum individual
surtax. 00
The Revenue Act of 1918 set the corporate tax rate for that year at
12 percent, the same as the maximum normal tax rate for individuals.
With dividends still subject to only the surtax, it reintroduced the tax rate
integration of prior years. For 1919 and 1920, Congress reduced the
maximum corporate tax rate to 10 percent and reduced the maximum
normal tax rate for individuals to 8 percent, thereby introducing a limited
degree of double taxation on distributed earnings to the extent of that
two point spread.o'0 The introduction of a lower normal rate bracket for
lower income, 6 percent in 1918, and 4 percent in 1919 and 1920,
without a mechanism for applying it to corporations, further introduced a
limited degree of double taxation. 10 2  At the same time, that the
corporate tax was all or mostly offset by not applying the normal tax to
dividends resulted in a significant degree to tax integration.
This form of partial tax integration, via the practice of imposing a
corporate tax at a rate higher than the maximum normal individual rate,
and subjecting dividends only to the individual surtax but not the normal
tax, continued through 1935.103 The Revenue Act of 1928, the law
applicable to Gregory's transactions, set a corporate tax rate of 12
percent,104 seven percentage points higher than the maximum normal
individual rate of 5 percent.0 5 The normal rate also included two lower
brackets, 1.5 percent for the first $4,000 of income, and 3 percent for the
second $4,000.106 As in the case of prior acts, the normal tax did not
99. War Revenue Act of 1917, § 1206(2), 40 Stat. at 334.
100. The War Revenue Act of 1917 also imposed a war excess profits tax on every business
whether conducted as a corporation, partnership, or individual proprietorship. War Revenue Act of
1917, § 201, 40 Stat. at 303.
101. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §§ 210, 216, 230, 40 Stat. 1057, 1062, 1069, 1075-76.
102. Revenue Act of 1918, §210, 40 Stat. at 1062. The 1918 Act introduced a further degree
of double taxation by limiting the application of the war excess profits tax, see supra note 100, only
to corporations. Revenue Act of 1918, §301, 40 Stat. at 1088. The World War I war profits tax was
last applied in 1921. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, §301, 42 Stat. 227, 272.
103. See BANK, supra note 70, at 109. The Revenue Act of 1936 subjected dividends to both
the normal tax and the surtax for the first time. Prior acts had provided for the deduction of divi-
dends for determining net income subject to the individual normal tax. Compare Revenue Act of
1934, ch. 277, § 25(a)(1), 48 Stat. 680, 692 with Revenue Act of 1936, ch.690, § 25, 49 Stat. 1648,
1662-63.
104. Revenue Act of 1928, § 13, 45 Stat. at 797.
105. Revenue Act of 1928, § 11, 45 Stat. at 795.
106. Id.
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apply to dividends. 0 7  The surtax on individuals, which did apply to
dividends, ranged from 1 percent to 20 percent. 08 Thus, the maximum
rate on most individual income was 25 percent, but the sum of maximum
rates on distributed corporate earnings was 32 percent (12 percent
corporate tax rate plus 20 percent surtax).
In an important sense, the taxation of corporate distributions
resembles that in effect as of this writing. The maximum corporate tax
rate is 35percent,109 and individual income tax rates are as high as 39.6
percent." 0 The maximum individual tax rate on qualified dividends,"'
however, was no more than 15 percent from 2003 through 2012112 and is
no more than 20 percent beginning in 2013.113 In both 1928, and today,
the maximum combined tax rate on corporate earnings is more than the
ordinary rate on other individual income, but the individual dividend rate
is partly reduced to reflect that dividend distributions have already been
taxed at the corporate level. Either in 1928 or in 2014, one might call
this partial double taxation or partial tax integration. Either way, it is a
compromise position between pure double taxation and full tax
integration.'14
Within the context of that compromise tax system there were, and
are, legislatively approved mechanisms that allow taxpayers to bypass
double taxation. This analysis focuses on those available in 1928.
107. Revenue Act of 1928, § 25, 45 Stat. at 802-03.
108. Revenue Act of 1928, § 12, 45 Stat. at 796-97.
109. I.R.C. § 11(b) (2012).
110. Beginning in 2013, a marginal tax rate of 39.6 percent applies to taxable income above a
threshold of $400,000 for single individuals, $425,000 for heads of household, and $450,000 for
married couples. For all other taxpayers, the individual tax rates remain as they had been before, at
various rates up to 35 percent. I.R.C. § 1(i) (2012), as amended by American Taxpayer Relief Act
of2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 101, 126 Stat. 2313, 2315-16.
Ill. L.R.C.§ I (h)(l 1) (2012).
112. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 302-303,
117 Stat. 752, 760-64 (2003) (adopting reduced rate dividend taxation for taxable years beginning
through 2008); Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222, §
102, 120 Stat. 345, 346 (2006) (extending reduced rate dividend taxation through taxable years be-
ginning in 2010); Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 102, 124 Stat. 3296, 3298-99 (2010) (extending reduced rate dividend
taxation through taxable years beginning in 2012).
113. American Taxpayer Relief Act of2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 102, 126 Stat. 2313, 2318
(2012) (increasing the maximum income tax rate on qualified dividends to 20 percent).
114. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-94, at 27-8 (2003); See also Rosanne Altshuler, Benjamin H. Har-
ris, & Eric Toder, Capital Income Taxation and Progressivity in a Global Economy, 30 VA. TAX
REV. 355, 357-58 (2010); Steven A. Bank, The Rise and Fall of Post-World War !! Tax Reform, 73
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207, 207 (2010); Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the Cor-
porate Double Tax, 95 VA. L. REV. 517, 525-26 (2009); Steven A. Bank, Dividends and a Tax Poli-
cy in the Long Run, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 537-40 (2007).
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Businesses could organize as partnerships." to qualify for passthrough
tax treatment, or they could raise capital as debt rather than equity to
qualify for the interest deductionll 6 shield from the corporate level tax.
Under the Revenue Act of 1928, these strategies were effective only in
relation to investors in a sufficiently low surtax bracket that it did not
justify a strategy of paying the corporate tax and causing the corporation
to retain earnings to defer the individual income tax. Using one of these
mechanisms clearly would not have been advantageous to all taxpayers.
However, that was the taxpayers' decision, and the statute certainly
allowed the use of these escape hatches to avoid double taxation to the
extent doing so would be advantageous.
Another such escape hatch was, and remains, the treatment of stock
redemptions. A portion of the redemption price paid to a shareholder
reflects the share's claim on corporate earnings and profits. In a double
tax regime, that value should be treated as a dividend. Yet in all
liquidation redemptions and some non-liquidation redemptions, the
Revenue Act of 1928 permitted the redemption to be treated as a sale,"17
thereby effectively bailing out earnings and profits as capital gains and
treating value distributed as non-taxable return of basis rather than
earnings and profits. The same remains true under the existing Internal
Revenue Code." 8
Under the prevailing law in 1928, the rule of law commonly
referred to as the General Utilities principle"9 was another such escape
hatch. A corporation recognized no gain or loss on liquidation.' 20 As
the Gregory case itself illustrates, this rule allowed a corporation
permanently to avoid the corporate level tax on substantial appreciated
gain. The application of the General Utilities principle to non-
liquidating distributions expanded the ability of corporations
permanently to avoid the corporate level tax on appreciated assets.
This brings the analysis back to Hand's assumption that the
alternative transaction was a corporate sale of the Monitor stock
followed by a distribution. A more likely alternative would have been
for United to distribute the Monitor stock to Gregory as a dividend.
115. Revenue Act of 1928, §§ 181-189, 45 Stat. at 840-42.
116. Revenue Act of 1928, § 23(b), 45 Stat. at 799.
117. Revenue Act of 1928, § 115(c) & (g), 45 Stat. at 822-23.
118. I.R.C. §§ 302-304, 331 (2012).
119. Gen. Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
120. See Treas. Reg. § 45, art. 547 (1919), reprinted in 134 UNITED STATES REVENUE ACTS
1909-1950, 140 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979) ("No gain or loss is realized by a corporation
from the mere distribution of its assets in kind upon dissolution, however they may have appreciated
or depreciated in value since their acquisition.").
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United would have reported no gain on the distribution of the
appreciated stock under the General Utilities principle. Gregory would
have had a dividend in the amount of the Monitor shares' valuel21 and
taken a basis in the shares equal to their fair market value.' 2 2 On the sale
of the Monitor shares for the same fair market value, she therefore
would have reported zero gain. Thus, the alternative transaction still
would have led to only one level of tax, except that it would have been
on the full value of the Monitor shares and at dividend tax rates instead
of capital gain rates.
While it is true that the definitive pronouncement of the General
Utilities principle' 23 did not come until almost twenty-one months after
Hand's opinion in Gregory,124 the issue was clearly percolating through
the system. Corporations were already taking the position that the
distribution of appreciated assets triggered no gain recognition, no doubt
based on an analogy to the 1919 treasury regulation providing that a
corporation recognized no gain or loss on the distribution of its assets in
complete liquidation.125 The General Utilities transaction itself occurred
in 1928, the same year as Gregory's transaction. At the time that Hand
was writing his opinion in 1934, the Board of Tax Appeals had upheld
the General Utilities non-recognition position.' 2 6 In fairness to Hand,
the issue of corporate taxability was not before the Second Circuit and
would not have been briefed, and perhaps he had not yet run across the
tax position that would eventually come to be known as the General
Utilities principle.
Nevertheless, it is clear how a transaction identical to Gregory's
would be treated after the Supreme Court affirmed Hand's opinion. It
would have been structured as a distribution of shares, subject to full
dividend taxation, but no tax at the corporate level. Hand assumed that
double taxation was the norm, but the use of escape hatches to bypass
double taxation was also a part of the system. The existing tax system
continues to include a significant number of escape hatches from double
taxation.127
The tax treatment of corporations was and is a carefully balanced
compromise between pure double taxation and integrationism. On the
121. Revenue Act of 1928, § I15(a), 45 Stat. at 822.
122. Cf 1.R.C. § 301(d) (2012).
123. Gen. Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).
124. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
125. See supra note 120.
126. Gen. Utilities & Operating Co. v. Comm'r, 29 B.T.A. 934 (1934).
127. See Polito, supra note 5, at 36-40, 52-57, 65.
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spectrum between those two poles, the balancing point of that
compromise simply moves as the legislative winds change. Likewise,
the system had and continues to have sanctioned escape hatches from
double taxation, even though sometimes there are more available and
sometimes fewer as one side or another gains the upper hand in the
double tax vs. integrationism policy debate. Taking the Revenue Act of
1928 at face value, Gregory simply discovered another escape hatch
from double taxation that allowed the integrationist result, and Hand's
creation of the business purpose requirement served partially to block
that particular escape hatch.
This analysis demonstrates that Hand's view is not aided by an
assertion that the norm for the system is double taxation. Congress did
not enact double taxation as the overriding norm of the system. It
enacted a legislative compromise between double taxation and
integrationism, which contained multiple approved escape hatches from
double taxation. As a consequence, the judicial creation of a new
mechanism to reinforce double taxation was not justified based on the
court's own preference for one side of the policy debate that led to the
legislative compromise, especially given that the carefully crafted
legislative text bore no indication at all of a Congressional command for
a business purposes requirement that would close explicit escape
hatches.
V. MULTIPLE TAXATION IN A DOUBLE-TAX SYSTEM
Even if one takes double taxation of corporate earnings as
normative, there is a particular fact in Gregory's case that contradicts
Hand's assumption that the normative result was taxation of both United
and Gregory in these transactions. The asset spun-off from United was
stock of a taxable corporation. Taxation of Monitor and of Gregory
constituted double taxation. Imposition of a further tax on United was a
third level of tax. Whatever may be said about double taxation, it is
even more difficult to justify yet another level of tax.12 8
In that regard, it is worth noting that the value of the Monitor stock
spun-off to Gregory can be divided into three components: (1) invested
capital represented by basis; (2) a claim on Monitor's earnings and
profits; and (3) the anticipation of future income to Monitor either in the
form of earnings or the future realization of asset appreciation already
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accrued. Because "[a]djusted basis reflects ... the whole history of the
tax treatment of an item that is to be closed out on disposition,"' 29 it
reflects a taxpayer's tax-paid and tax-forgiven investment in an asset.
By definition, therefore, its recovery is non-taxable.' 30
Second, to the extent that the value of Monitor stock represented a
claim on earnings and profits, it had already been subject to corporate
taxation and, even within a double tax regime, was not appropriately
subject to a second corporate level of tax. It is true that some of these
amounts might have been functionally subject to a zero corporate tax
rate,'"' but still included in earnings and profits.' 32 However, they would
have received the same treatment if received directly in United's hands,
and, therefore, a second corporate level of tax was unnecessary. The
existence of the intercorporate dividends received deduction' 3 3
acknowledges this point and serves to mitigate the problem of multiple
taxation.
The remainder of the stock's value represented a claim on amounts
that would be subject to taxation at the Monitor level at a future time.
The effectuation of double tax did not require taxing those amounts in
United's hands as well. One might object that not taxing this last
component of Monitor stock value on United's transfer of the shares
effectively would have allowed tax deferral to the extent that it
represented unrealized appreciation of assets held by Monitor.
However, that tax would have been deferred in any case, even if Gregory
had held the shares directly. That deferral is the consequence of the
realization rule itself and not the corporate holding of the Monitor stock.
Thus, a double tax system had no intrinsic need to impose a tax at
the United level. The dividends received deduction' 3 4 made it possible
to move previously taxed earnings up the next level in the corporate
chain without triggering a multiple tax problem.'3 5  However, a
129. William D. Andrews, On Beyond Tufts, 61 TAXES (CCH) 949,954 (1983).
130. See 1.R.C. §§ 301(c)(2), 1001 (2012).
131. Cf 1.R.C. § 103 (2012) (state and local bond interest).
132. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6(b) (1960).
133. Revenue Act of 1928, § 23(p), 45 Stat. at 801-02; I.R.C. §§ 243-246A (2012).
134. Revenue Act of 1928, § 23(p), 45 Stat. at 801-02.
135. Until 1935, the deduction was 100 percent of all dividends received in all cases. In that
year, the deduction was reduced to 90 percent. Revenue Act of 1935, § 102(h), 49 Stat. 1014, 1016.
At the time this change was justified as (1) offsetting the benefit of dividing a single business into
multiple corporations and thereby getting multiple uses of the lower tax brackets, and (2) a means
for discouraging holding company structures that were thought problematic at the time. See Schaf-
fer, supra note 128, at 163-69. In general, the current structure allows a 70 percent deduction if the
recipient corporation owns less than 20 percent of the distributing corporation's stock, an 80 percent
deduction for 20 percent to 80 percent ownership of the distributing corporation, and a 100 percent
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corporation that does not control another corporation in which it holds
stock cannot cause it to distribute earnings.
In the absence of a dividend distribution, it is possible to realize the
value of that earnings claim by a sale or exchange. The Internal
Revenue Code, and its predecessors, has not allowed an exemption from
tax on a corporation's sale or exchange of stock of another corporation.
That results in a degree of multiple taxation on intercorporate stock
holdings that is clearly inconsistent with the policy underlying the
dividends received deduction.
That treatment of stock sales by corporations can be fully
rationalized based on the need to address conflicting policy
considerations. In the absence of corporate gain recognition on the
disposition of corporate stock, individuals could defer taxation of stock
sales by holding all of their corporate stock via incorporated
pocketbooks, buying and selling shares through stock holding
companies. Stock appreciation would not be taxed until extracted from
the holding company as a distribution.' Moreover, in some, perhaps
many, cases it would not be taxed at all because of the step-up in basis
on death.'3 7 A desire to impose at least one level of tax on the sale of
stock is sufficient by itself to rationalize the taxation of corporations that
dispose of corporate stock.13 8
Nevertheless, to the extent that a corporate disposition of corporate
stock can be structured to trigger a single shareholder level tax and no
further corporate level tax, the needs of a double tax regime are satisfied.
As previously noted, the distribution of appreciated stock as a dividend
under the General Utilities principle, achieved exactly this result of a
deduction for 80 percent or greater ownership. I.R.C. § 243 (2012).
136. From one perspective, the perspective that taxation should be tied to consumption, see
infra note 150 and accompanying text, such a result would not have been objectionable to the extent
that it allowed one investment to be rolled into another without triggering a tax and triggered an
individual tax only when value was accessed to fund consumption. Although Congress included
elements of consumption taxation in the system, see infra notes 159-163 and accompanying text, it
did not include this one.
137. At the individual taxpayer's death, the value of the shares would be stepped-up to full
value. See Revenue Act of 1928, § I13(a)(5), 45 Stat. at 819; I.R.C. §§ 1014, 1022 (2012). The
liquidation of the holding company would trigger no taxation at the shareholder level, because the
amount realized would be zero. See Revenue Act of 1928, § 115(c), 45 Stat. at 822, I.R.C. § 331
(2012). The taxpayers would receive the stock portfolio with a basis equal to its value. See I.R.C. §
334(a) (2012). In addition, prior to the repeal of the General Utilities principle, there also would
have been no corporate level tax, see supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
138. Another justification for imposing corporate taxation on stock sales is that the sale of a
subsidiary's stock can be regarded as the equivalent of the sale of the assets of an unincorporated
division, which would be subject to corporate level taxation. That justification is not pertinent here
because Monitor was not a subsidiary of United.
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shareholder tax and no corporate tax.139  The literal application of the
reorganization provision,140 to the extent that it resulted in no corporate
tax and a single shareholder level tax, served the same end. In that
sense, and to that extent, Hand's assumption that taxation at the United
level was normative was wrong, even if one takes double taxation as the
appropriate baseline.
A. Basis and Capital Gain Issues
A pair of objections to this analysis needs to be addressed. The first
is that this issue is not just whether Gregory was taxed at the individual
level, but also the extent and nature of the taxation. The objection is that
too much of the value she received was treated as basis' 4 1 and that, in a
double tax regime, the shareholder tax is normatively taxed at dividend
rates and not capital gain rates.14 2  With regard to the basis issue, as
noted above,14 3 there is no a priori principle that would justify preferring
one basis allocation over the other. It is necessarily a policy question
that must be decided on a case-by-case basis. The literal application of
the statute as written was as plausible a resolution to that question as any
other.
With regard to the issue of capital gain treatment, it is worth noting
that some methods of extracting the value from a corporation have been
subject to ordinary tax rates 4 4 and others make it possible to access
capital gain rates. 145 The distinction between them, which is predicated
solely on a policy decision to apply different tax treatment to
transactions with similar effect, creates a line drawing problem. The
139. See supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1928, §§ 112(c)(2), 115(a) & (b), 45 Stat. at 817, 822; I.R.C. §§
301, 302(d), 356(a)(2) (2012).
145. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1928, §§ 112(c)(1), 115(c), (g) & (h), 45 Stat. at 817, 822-23;
I.R.C. §§ 302-304, 331, 356(a)(1) (2012). Since 2003, the benefit ofcapital gain rates has extended
to qualified dividends. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-27, §§ 302-303, 117 Stat. 752, 760-64 (2003) (adopting reduced rate dividend taxation for tax-
able years beginning through 2008); Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-222, § 102, 120 Stat. 345, 346 (2006) (extending reduced rate dividend taxation through
taxable years beginning in 2010); Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job
Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 102, 124 Stat. 3296, 3298-99 (2010) (extending re-
duced rate dividend taxation through taxable years beginning in 2012); American Taxpayer Relief
Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 102, 126 Stat. 2313, 2318-19 (2013) (making the application of
capital gain rates to dividends permanent).
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resolution is necessarily arbitrary and resolved not by a priori principles
but by the choices made in the language of the statute. 14 6 The literal
application of the statute in Gregory was just as plausible a manner of
drawing that line as any other.
On the other hand, from a perspective that favors double taxation
but not multiple taxation, one might rationalize the result in Gregory
based on the manner in which it drove future such transactions to use the
General Utilities principle. By denying reorganization treatment, a
future equivalent transaction would occur as a direct distribution of
stock, triggering no corporate level tax and a full dividend tax at the
shareholder level. 147 From this perspective, Hand's opinion could be
rationalized as preserving double taxation by driving these stock spin-off
transactions to use the General Utilities principle. At the same time, the
application of General Utilities to the distribution of other, non-stock,
assets allowed for functional tax integration.
B. Which Option to Choose
This raises the second objection that, regardless of whether the
asset spin-off occurred via a distribution protected by the General
Utilities principle or the literal application of the reorganization
provision, a court was not in a position to impose a distinction in
treatment depending upon whether the asset spun off was stock in
another corporation subject itself to taxation or to some other asset, such
as operating assets. A decision that would allow the avoidance of
multiple taxation in the former situation would allow the avoidance of
double taxation in the latter situation. This represents an alternate
rationalization, that the imposition of the multiple tax in some cases is
desirable to preserve the double tax in others.
Either rationalization of Hand's analysis, however, is predicated on
the court making a policy choice on its own authority. Even if one is
convinced that double taxation is the overriding norm, it is not obvious
that this principle overrides the desire to avoid multiple taxation. Here
again, as in the case of double taxation vs. integationism, the statute
Congress produced was a compromise between competing policies. The
dividends received deduction served to mitigate multiple taxation1 4 8 but
146. See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV.
L. REv. 985 (1956); Robert C. Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory
Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L. J. 90, 110-17 (1977); Polito, supra note 75, at 543-47.
147. See supra notes 119-127 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text.
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did not fully resolve the issue.149 The literal application of the statute as
written represents the legislative compromise between the two policies.
Yet there was another alternative open to Hand besides choosing
which of the two competing policies was more important. The literal
application of the statute would have left to Congress the policy
questions of whether these fine distinctions in result justify creating a
more nuanced statute. Is the desire to tax Gregory as if she had received
a dividend sufficiently important to justify denying tax-free treatment at
the corporate level? Or would it have been possible to amend the statute
to impose full dividend taxation on the spin-off of marketable shares,
while preserving the rest of the reorganization apparatus for other spin-
off transactions? Is the desire to impose double taxation on the spin-off
of operating assets sufficiently important to impose cascading taxation
on the spin-off of marketable stock? Each of these policy questions is
one that implicitly had an answer in the Revenue Act of 1928, and each
of them could have had a different answer later based on the ongoing
legislative process.
VI. A CONSUMPTION TAX PERSPECTIVE
From a consumption tax perspective, accretion to asset value should
not be taxed until that value has been realized and consumed. Even in a
system in which it is not practical to track cash realizations through into
investment in other assets, it is clear that from a consumption tax
perspective the direct rollover from one investment into another should
not trigger taxation.1 50 Based on that logic, the division of Gregory's
investment in one corporation, United, into an investment in two
corporations, United and Averill, should not have triggered any taxation.
Moreover, the liquidation of Averill also had the effect of rolling one
investment into another, the Monitor stock. From a consumption tax
perspective, the earliest time at which Gregory should have been subject
to tax was the sale of the Monitor stock, which happened to be the same
day as the liquidation of Averill. From that perspective, therefore, the
literal application of the statute as written produced the appropriate
result.
A. "But, It's an Income Tax, Isn't It?"
Here, one must anticipate an objection that, "It's an income tax
149. See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Andrews, Consumption Tax, supra note 7, at 151-52.
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system, not a consumption tax system." If, however, income is equated
with accretion to wealth, as that statement assumes, the system has never
been a pure income tax system. The actual tax base is, and always has
been, a hybrid of income in the accretionist sense and consumption.
The familiar Haig-Simons definition of the accretionist paradigm
would equate income with "the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of
the store of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the
value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of
the period in question."' ' Yet there is no a priori reason to equate
income and accretionism. Irving Fisher famously argued that income
should not include accretions to asset value.152  That the Haig-Simons
definition appropriates the term "income" to refer to accretionism and
that the actual tax self-identifies as an income tax does not resolve the
problem of understanding the tax base produced by the statutory text or
identify the ideal tax base.
In the interpretive context, the real issue is not the semantic one of
defining the term income in the abstract but of identifying the contours
of the tax base on which Congress has chosen to impose taxation. The
tax law is a self-conscious artifact of human construction, designed to
allocate the material costs of government based on some principle of
justice, prominent examples of which are taxpayers' ability to pay,15 3 or
the benefits taxpayers receive in exchange for their taxes, 5 4 or the
151. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938); see also ROBERT M. HAIG,
The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert
M. Haig ed., 1921) ("Income is the money value of the net accretion to one's economic power be-
tween two points of time.").
152. Irving Fisher, Are Savings Income?, 9 AM. ECON. Ass'N Q. 21 (1908).
153. See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 151, at 5-15 ("The greater part of what has been written
about justice in taxation has been couched in terms of sacrifice. This concept, along with 'ability'
and 'faculty,' is a more or less legitimate progeny of 'utility'...."); Alfred G. Buehler, Ability to
Pay, I TAX L. REv. 243, 243 (1946) ("A slogan popular for centuries in tax discussions has been the
phrase 'ability to pay.' ... . To many persons ability to pay is synonymous with justice in taxation.
When one attempts to define it, he encounters a task as difficult, indeed, as the definition of such
concepts as 'truth,' 'beauty,' and 'justice."'); Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case
for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 480 (1952) ("[I]t is not infrequently urged that
ability to pay is the cardinal criterion of tax justice."); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Un-
fairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM.
J. TAX POL'Y 221, 233 (1995) ("The predominant alternative to benefit theory in scholarly discourse
has been the ability to pay theory of taxation. Pursuant to this theory, an equitable system of taxa-
tion is considered linked to the capacity of a person to bear the tax bill."). For purposes of this dis-
cussion, one need not make the fine distinction that some authors have made between ability to pay
theory, sacrifice theory, and utility theory. See also Blum & Kalven, supra at 455-86.
154. See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 151, at 3-5 ("A familiar answer to this question is found in
the doctrine of taxation according to benefit."); Blum & Kalven, supra note 153, at 451 ("Since it is
obvious that each taxpayer derives some benefits from the operation of government, the magnitude
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redistribution of society's material wealth.15 5  The tax law cannot
directly pursue its goals, however, because the satisfaction of those
policies is not susceptible of direct measurement. Because the tax law
cannot address its substantive policy goals directly, it uses measurable
economic concepts as proxies.
The question is whether accretionism or consumption taxation is
the better proxy to the underlying policy goal. Professors William
Andrews and Alvin Warren famously debated the issue in a series of law
review articles.15 6 The question continues to be debated,157 as it was in
of such benefits suggests itself as a standard for distributing the tax burden."); Richard A. Epstein,
Taxation, Regulation, and Confiscation, 20 OSGOODE HALL L.J., 433, 438 (1982) (Arguing, that
interpreting the Fifth Amendment as prohibiting taxation producing a disproportionate impact
would "help prevent the creation of a situation in which the proponents of a tax . . enjoy benefits in
excess of cost while others are made to bear costs in excess of benefits."); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 285-305 (1985) (subjecting a
number of taxes to a disproportionate impact analysis); Schoenblum, supra note 153, at 225 ("A
common assertion of defenders of differences in taxation has been the contention that higher income
earners ought to pay more because they have benefited more from the society and the services af-
forded by the government.").
155. See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 151, at 15-19 ("The case for drastic progression in taxation
must be rested on the case against inequality- on the ethical or aesthetic judgment that the prevail-
ing distribution of wealth and income reveals a degree (and/or kind) of inequality which is distinctly
evil or unlovely."); Blum & Kalven, supra note 153, at 486-90 ("A progressive tax on income nec-
essarily operates to lessen the inequalities in the distribution of that income."); JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 277-79 (1971) ("[T]here is a distribution branch [of the institutions of distribu-
tive justice]. Its task is to preserve an approximate justice in distributive shares by means of taxation
and the necessary adjustments in the rights of property.. . . The purpose of these levies . .. is ...
gradually and continually to correct the distribution of wealth and to prevent concentrations of pow-
er detrimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity ..... ); Andrews,
Consumption Tax supra note 7, at 1165 (concluding that the "primary, intended, real effect of any
general revenue-raising tax is to curtail some part of the private consumption of economic resources
that would otherwise occur, in order to free those resources for public use, including redistribution
to the poor.").
156. See, e.g. Andrews, Consumption Tax, supra note 7; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a
Consumption- Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975) [hereinafter
Warren, Fairness]; William D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Profes-
sor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1975); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Would a Consumption Tax be
Fairer than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980).
157. See, e.g. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX (1997);
LAWRENCE S. SEIDMAN, THE USA TAX: A PROGRESSIVE CONSUMPTION TAX (1997); John K.
McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption- Type Income Tax Proposals in the United
States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2095 (2000); Arthur
Cockfield, Income Taxes and Individual Liberty: A Lockean Perspective on Radical Consumption
Tax Reform, 46 S.D. L. REV. 8 (2001); Mitchell L. Engler, A Progressive Consumption Tax for In-
dividuals: An Alternative Hybrid Approach, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1205 (2003); Daniel S. Goldberg, The
U.S. Consumption Tax: Evolution, Not Revolution, 57 TAX LAW. 1 (2003); Edward J. McCaffery, A
New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807 (2005); Mitchell L. Engler, Progressive Con-
sumption Taxes, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 55 (2005); Chris W. Sanchirico, A Critical Look at the Economic
Argument for Taxing Only Labor Income, 63 TAX L. REV. 867 (2010); Edward J. McCaffery, James
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the early decades of federal taxation.
Transactionalism, the actual income tax regime in which the tax
base is measured by completed transactions, is and always has been a
hybrid of accretionism and consumption taxation. Accretionism would
tax increases in property value as they accrue, and consumption taxation
would defer the tax until an "act of consumption."l 5 9 Early case law
questioned whether realized capital gains were to be treated as part of
"income" for purposes of the tax at all.16 0 Ultimately,
Congress ... effectively split the difference between the two theories
in taxing property [appreciation] ... . Capital appreciation was not in-
come as long as the taxpayer continued to the hold the property, but
once it was sold or exchanged in a "realization event," as broadly de-
fined, the previous growth in value would be recognized as taxable in-
come . ... [T]his compromise permitted Congress to tax capital gains
while promising to maintain a distinction between paper and real
gains-taxing the latter while exempting the former.161
From there Congress moved the compromise further in the direction of
consumption taxation by enacting explicit nonrecognition provisions,
because "[e]ven the realization [rule] . . . led to the creation of income
tax liabilities sooner, in many instances, than Congress deemed wise or
appropriate."l62
In 1918, Congress allowed for nonrecognition and deferral of
taxation in transactions that otherwise triggered realization, providing
that:
When property is exchanged for other property, the property received
in exchange shall for the purpose of determining gain or loss be treated
as the equivalent of cash to the amount of its fair market value, if any;
but when in connection with the reorganization, merger, or consolida-
tion of a corporation a person receives in place of stock or securities
owned by him new stock or securities of no greater aggregate par or
R. Hines, Jr., The Last Best Hope for Progressivity in Tax, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1031 (2010); Law-
rence Zelenak, Debt-Financed Consumption and a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 64 TAX. L.
REV. 1 (2010).
158. See supra notes 151-152, and accompanying text.
159. ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, Reorganizations and the Closed Transaction, in THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 114, 135 (Robert M. Haig, ed., 1921).
160. See Brewster v. Walsh, 268 F. 207, 213-15 (D. Conn. 1920); Lynch v. Turrish, 247 U.S.
221, 231 (1918).
161. BANK, supra note 70, at 123. See also Andrews, Consumption Tax, supra note 7, at
1129.
162. LAWRENCE H. SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND
LOSSES 42 (195 1).
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face value, no gain or loss shall be deemed to occur from the ex-
change, and the new stock or securities received shall be treated as tak-
ing the place of the stock, securities, or property exchanged. 163
From an accretionist perspective, the reorganization provision is not
justifiable, from a consumption tax perspective it is too narrow.
The contours of this compromise continued to evolve in the
following years. In 1924, Congress clarified that nonrecognition applied
not just to individuals, but also to the corporation's party to a
reorganization.164 By the time of Gregory's transactions, nonrecognition
treatment had been extended to like-kind exchanges,16 5 stock-for-stock
exchanges in a single corporation,166 transfers to a corporation controlled
by the transferor, 167 and transactions in connection with reorganizations,
more elaborately defined to provide that:
The term "reorganization" means (A) a merger or consolidation (in-
cluding the acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority of the
voting stock and at least a majority of the total number of shares of all
other classes of stock of another corporation, or substantially all the
properties of another corporation), or (B) a transfer by a corporation of
all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately after the
transfer the transferor or its stockholders or both are in control of the
corporation to which the assets are transferred, or (C) a recapitaliza-
tion, or (D) a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization,
however effected.168
In addition, nonrecognition was extended to include involuntary
conversions 6 9 and stock dividends.1 7 0 To the extent that a consumption
tax is viewed as equivalent to a tax that exempts the return to capital,17'
any move toward reducing the effective tax rate on capital income may
be considered a step towards the consumption tax model.172  In that
sense, preferential rates for long-term capital gains1 7 3 and the step-up in
basis of property acquired from a decedent' 74 may be seen as examples
163. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1058, 1060 (emphasis added).
164. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(b)(3), 43 Stat. 263, 256.
165. Revenue Act of 1928, § 12(b)(1), 45 Stat. at 816.
166. Revenue Act of 1928, § I1 2(b)(2), 45 Stat. at 816.
167. Revenue Act of 1928, § I 12(b)(5), 45 Stat. at 816-17.
168. Revenue Act of 1928, § 112(i), 45 Stat. at 818
169. Revenue Act of 1928, § 112(f), 45 Stat. at 817.
170. Revenue Act of 1928, §I 15(f), 45 Stat. at 822.
171. See Warren, Fairness, supra note 156, at 938-41.
172. See Andrews, Consumption Tax, supra note 7, at 1131-35.
173. Revenue Act of 1928, § 101, 45 Stat. at 811-12; I.R.C. § 1(h) (2012).
174. Revenue Act of 1928, § I 13(a)(5), 45 Stat. 819; I.R.C. §§ 1014, 1022 (2012).
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of consumption-tax thinking. 17 5
In the generations since then, the compromise between
accretionism and consumption taxation has continued to evolve. In
some respects, it has moved nearer to accretionism, such as the
imposition of additional restrictions on the availability of reorganization
treatment,176 and the adoption of mark-to-market accounting for dealers
in securities.17 7  In other respects, it has moved nearer to the
consumption tax ideal. Nonrecognition is available for contributions to
partnerships, 78 and for most partnership distributions of property.179
Other clear examples are the exclusion from taxable income or
deductibility of amounts used for retirement savings,'8 0 educational
IRAs,18 1 and medical savings accounts.' 8 2 The adoption of accelerated
depreciation, to the extent that it advances the transactionalist tax toward
the full expensing of investments, is a movement toward consumption
tax treatment.183
The balancing point of the compromise moves along the spectrum
between accretionism and consumption taxation as the legislative winds
change. The reorganization provision of the Revenue Act of 1928 was a
large piece of that compromise, as it existed at the time. Hand's opinion
creating the business purpose requirement unilaterally moved the
balancing point of Congress's compromise. In a tax system that was,
and is, a legislative compromise between accretionism and consumption
taxation, the judicial creation of a new mechanism to reset the balancing
point of that compromise was not justified based on the court's own
preference for one side of the pertinent policy debate. Here again, that is
especially true given that the carefully crafted legislative text bore no
indication at all of a Congressional command for a business purposes
requirement.
175. Another such example is the exclusion from income of gain on owner-occupied housing.
I.R.C. § 121 (2012).
176. I.R.C. §§ 355, 368 (2012).
177. I.R.C. § 475 (2012).
178. I.R.C. § 721 (2012).
179. I.R.C. § 731 (2012).
180. I.R.C. §§ 401-409 (2012).
181. I.R.C. § 530 (2012).
182. I.R.C. § 220 (2012).
183. See Anthony P. Polito, Fiddlers on the Tax: Depreciation ofAntique Instruments Invites
Reexamination ofBroader Tax Policy, 13 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 87, 96-101 (1996).
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B. Basis and Capital Gain Issues
A further pair of objections to this analysis needs to be addressed.
The first is that under a pure consumption tax the entire proceeds of the
sale of the Monitor stock would have been taxed, and therefore too little
of the proceeds were taxed as a consequence of the reduction of those
proceeds by a portion of Gregory's basis in the United stock allocated to
the Monitor stock in Gregory's hands. In an idealized consumption tax
system, assets would not have basis. The full amount of value extracted
from assets and consumed in any given year would be added to the
individual's tax base or taxable "income." At the same time, the reason
that there would be no need to keep track of basis is that the full amount
of value invested into any asset would be deducted from the individual's
tax base.184
Basis accounting exists in a transactionalist system precisely
because it is a hybrid of income taxation and consumption taxation. In
the transactionalist system, basis represents the portion of an amount
realized on the disposition of an investment asset that is deemed to be a
return of the taxpayer's capital. That capital has previously been subject
to taxation. Only the excess over that return of capital is subject to
taxation. Thus, some consumption is not taxed as it occurs, because it is
deemed to be out of tax-paid amounts, that is amounts already subject to
inclusion in the tax base.185  From a consumption tax perspective,
therefore, basis reflects amounts that have already been pre-taxed
because they were previously included in the tax base without having
been consumed.'86
Gregory's basis in the United stock was $350,000.' From a
184. See Andrews, Consumption Tax, supra note 7, at 1151-53. In such a system, if Gregory
reinvested the entire proceeds of the Monitor stock sale in the same taxable year, then none of the
proceeds should have been taxable that year. In the absence of any information that she did reinvest
those proceeds, however, this analysis proceeds on the assumption that none of the proceeds were
reinvested and were instead entirely consumed.
185. Some of it may have been intentionally tax-forgiven; for example, the stepped up basis
on inherited property, .R.C. § 1014 (2012). In that case, it is best seen as tax-paid capital that has
been taxed as a policy decision at a zero percent rate. To the extent that these amounts are reflected
in basis, they are appropriately referred to as "tax-forgiven" amounts. That does not detract from
the fact that they have already been accounted for in the individual's tax base.
186. There is a further complication in the case of the investment of borrowed capital, which is
included in basis in anticipation of amounts to be included in the tax base at a later time. See An-
thony P. Polito, Borrowing, Return of Capital Conventions and the Structure of the Income Tax: An
Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 17 VA. TAX REv. 467 (1998); Anthony P. Polito, The Role of Pre-
scription in the Interpretive Problem of Basis Determination, 53 TAx LAW. 615 (2000). That nu-
ance is beyond the scope of, and not necessary to address in the context of, this analysis.
187. Gregory v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. 223, 224 (1932).
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consumption tax perspective, that entire amount had been pre-taxed, that
is, it had been taxed in anticipation of future consumption. The amount
she realized on the Monitor stock spun-off to her from United was
$133,333.33.' From a consumption tax perspective, one could easily
have adopted a convention that treated the entire amount realized as a
return of tax-paid amounts that should not have been taxed again. If that
had been the case, none of the Monitor stock proceeds would have been
taxed, and Gregory's basis in the United stock would have been reduced
by the full amount of the proceeds. Thus, from a consumption tax
perspective, the inclusion of any positive amount of those Monitor stock
proceeds was more than sufficient because so much of Gregory's capital
had been pre-taxed.189
A second objection relates to the preferential capital gain rate
treatment that Gregory asserted, which would presumably not have been
available in a consumption tax regime.1 90 There is no way to know for
sure what cash-flow, if any, would receive the benefit of preferential
rates in a consumption tax regime. Even assuming that there would be
no such preferential rates, one of the justifications for the capital gain
preference is precisely that the transactionalist regime is a hybrid of
income taxation and consumption taxation. From a consumption tax
perspective, the transactionalist regime taxes so much capital in advance
of its consumption, the proper time for that taxation, that in present-
value terms much capital appreciation is subject to over taxation if taxed
at the full ordinary rates.
Here again, the application of the capital gain rate as written in the
Revenue Act of 1928, simply reflects the balancing point of the
legislative compromise between competing tax regimes. Here again, the
judicial creation of a new mechanism to reset the balancing point of that
compromise was not justified based on the court's own preference for
one side of the pertinent policy debate.
VII. CONCLUSION
Learned Hand's opinion took a wrong turn both from multiple
policy perspectives and in terms of the problem of statutory
188. Id.
189. Gregory purchased the United stock in 1920 and 1921. Id. It might well be the case that
she carned some of the capital invested before the adoption of the 16th Amendment in 1913. In that
case, it should be regarded as tax-paid capital that was at the time subject to a zero percent tax rate.
190. See Andrews, Consumption Tax, supra note 7, at 1153.
191. See Andrews, Consumption Tax, supra note 7, at 1131-35.
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interpretation. Elsewhere, in an article entitled Advancing to Corporate
Tax Integration: A Laissez-Faire Approach,192 I advanced the
proposition that although systematic corporate tax integration is unlikely
to be enacted in the foreseeable future, integrationism should be
regarded as normative. The Laissez-Faire Approach proposes that, to
the extent that legal mechanisms serve to prevent self-help corporate tax
integration, they are counterproductive, wasting valuable taxpayer, IRS,
and judicial resources.193
A court does not have authority to create tax integration that
Congress has not authorized, and this Article does not claim otherwise.
At the same time, the Integrationist Perspective does assert that it is a
mistake for courts to block escape hatches from double taxation that
Congress has left in the statute. Hand's opinion is mistaken from this
perspective because it unnecessarily and counterproductively extends
double taxation beyond the scope to which Congress imposed it.
The case for multiple levels of taxation of corporate earnings is
even harder to justify. Here again, Hand's opinion is mistaken from a
policy perspective. By creating the business purpose requirement, it
unnecessarily and counterproductively extends multiple taxation beyond
the situations to which the statute makes it unavoidable.
From a consumption tax perspective the policy analysis is much the
same. The rollover of capital from one investment to another ought not
to trigger taxation. This Article does not advocate that courts attempt to
create a rollover privilege in circumstances that are not justified by the
statute. It was a mistake, however, for the court to create a mechanism
to block tax-deferred rollover in circumstances beyond those mandated
by the statutory language.
Of course, there is another perspective of all these policy
perspectives. That is a perspective that tax should be imposed on all
accretions to wealth and that at least two levels of tax should apply to
investments in corporate form, perhaps more to the extent that
corporations hold shares in other corporations. That is the point at
which the Article's analysis turns from policy to the appropriate judicial
role in interpretation.
The Revenue Act of 1928 reflected a carefully negotiated
legislative compromise among competing perspectives of sound tax
policy, as does the modem Internal Revenue Code. It is fair to say that
the advocates of no particular policy perspective are fully satisfied. That
192. Polito, supra notc 5.
193. Polito, supra notc 5, at 40-42.
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is the nature of the legislative process. Competing policy perspectives
frequently need to be compromised in order to generate the necessary
legislative majorities. As much as a constitution "is made for people of
fundamentally differing views,"l9' legislative compromise makes it
possible for them to live peacefully together in a single body politic.
This is where Hand's opinion was most wrong. He elevated his
own policy preference above all of the others that went into that
carefully crafted legislative compromise, and made it the sole key for the
interpretation of the statutory text. His opinion for the Second Circuit
reset that compromise in a direction closer to his own preference by
imposing on Gregory's spin-off transaction a business purpose
requirement not justified by the statute itself.
In the generations since his decision, Congress has itself imposed
requirements on spin-offs that make them less readily available.'9 5 Over
time, the balancing point in Congress shifts. That too is intrinsic to the
legislative process, and the balancing point of the evolving compromise
that is the Internal Revenue Code naturally shifts as well. The very
adoption of those additional restrictions proves that Congress is fully
capable of moving the statute in the direction its majorities prefer. Until
they do so, however, the best evidence of where they have chosen for the
statute to balance among competing policy concerns is, and was, the text
of the statute itself.
One might argue that, because Congress had full authority to
reverse Hand's result, the mistaken use of his authority extended only
until the next opportunity for Congress to have so done. Moreover,
given that Congress did not reverse legislatively, it appears that Hand
correctly "guessed" Congress's desire. However, even setting aside the
seemingly likely possibility that judicial precedent creates a degree of
inertia in favor of the new judicially created status quo, Hand could
equally have "guessed" that Congress desired to have its statute enforced
as written. If that were wrong, that error, too, and to the same extent,
would have persisted only until the next opportunity to reverse
legislatively. That Congress added additional restrictions on the
availability of similar spin-off transactions,196 some of them in reversal
of judicial interpretation, indicates that Congress is fully capable of
concluding that the statute as written is too liberal in application and
calls for additional restrictions. The virtue of "guessing" that the statute
194. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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should be applied as written is that it eliminates the need to guess what
additional terms Congress would "want" to add to the statute but did not.
Perhaps the clearest statement of the weakness of Hand's analysis
comes from Hand himself.
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax ... merely
dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession; ... leave in my
mind only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully
concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within
my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of
time. 197
Hand assumed the revenue act contained a single overriding "purport"
and therefore failed to see it as a compromise among multiple
inconsistent "purports." This makes his decision wrong, because, again
in his own words:
When a judge tries to find out what the government would have in-
tended which it did not say, he puts into its mouth things which he
thinks it ought to have said, and that is very close to substituting what
he himself thinks right. Let him beware, however, or he will usurp the
office of government, even though in a small way he must do so in or-
der to execute its real commands at all.198
That, above all, is what made the Hand's judicial creation of the business
purpose wrong.
197. Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947).
198. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 108 (Irving Dillard ed., 1960).
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